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History has shown that a power vacuum on the Korean Peninsula is an invitation to 
aggression. The 60-year-period from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 to the end of the 
Korean War stands in marked contrast to the 60-year-period of de facto peace since 1953. In 
the former, four major wars enveloped Korea and its vicinity, including the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05 and the Second Sino-Japanese War. In the latter, the balance of power has 
been maintained primarily by virtue of the U.S.-ROK alliance, albeit at the cost of periodic 
lethal attacks and threats from North Korea. This chapter addresses the historical lessons 
of power shift in Northeast Asia for contemporary international politics and the strategic 
implications of South Korea’s embrace of China and its seeming inability to overcome, in 
Korean parlance, “issues of the past” with Japan.
In the present security dynamics in Northeast Asia, which closely resemble the Cold War 
configuration of the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance vs. the PRC-Russia-DPRK contingent, South 
Korea’s recent tilt toward China and apathy for Japan come at considerable potential cost to 
its own long-term national interest as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Its need 
to protect its vital economic relations with China and not jeopardize the overall relationship 
is evident; but its future security and commercial interests can best be advanced within the 
U.S.-led alliance structure—even with the bilateral historical issues between Seoul and 
Tokyo. The next major geopolitical shift or “change in the status quo” in the region will 
likely emanate from North Korea. China, which, arguably, nods in approval at North Korea’s 
provocations while issuing occasional protestations, is poised to further bolster its significant 
leverage vis-à-vis Pyongyang and Seoul by exploiting its “North Korea card” in the long-
term strategic competition against the United States. Beijing’s seemingly unrelenting 
strategic support of Pyongyang has serious implications for North Korea’s denuclearization 
and Korean unification, a reality that remains unaffected by the bonhomie overflowing from 
the Park Geun-hye-Xi Jinping summit on June 26, 2013. Unable to withstand the military 
threat coming from North Korea and China on its own, Japan has dramatically bolstered 
its U.S. alliance, as borne out in the October 3, 2013 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security 
Consultative Committee (SCC). Is Seoul now the weakest link in this military standoff?
South Korea’s Not-So-Strategic Triangular 
Relations with China and Japan
A snapshot of South Korea in early March 2014 may lend weight to the following unproven 
dictum (embraced by this particular author): Triangular relations among states may at times 
be as convoluted and toxic as those among individuals. According to a March 3 phone survey 
of 1000 South Koreans by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, asking respondents to rate 
the leaders of North Korea, Japan, the United States, China, and Russia, Kim Jong-un came 
out ahead of Abe Shinzo by a margin of 1.3 to 1.1 on the survey’s zero-to-ten scale, zero 
being the least favorable.1 Among the leaders of five nations, Barack Obama led with a 
score of 6.2, followed by Xi Jinping at just under 5, with Vladimir Putin next at 3.5, before 
popularity plummeted to the depths seen only for Kim and Abe.
That South Koreans overall favor Obama, the leader of the sole treaty ally, makes sense to 
observers. However, the notion that citizens of an open democracy (that faces an existential 
threat from the DPRK, an alternate Korean state that is ruled by a menacing dynastic 
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dictatorship) actually favor the leader of China (a single-party communist dictatorship that 
shares with the DPRK an alliance forged in blood)2 over the leader of Japan (a wealthy 
democracy and neighbor to which it is strategically aligned by virtue of the U.S. alliance 
structure in the region) may seem counterintuitive.3 Even higher on the counterintuitive scale is 
preference for Kim Jong-un, a third-generation totalitarian leader who apparently was behind 
North Korea’s torpedoing of a South Korean navy ship and the shelling of an inhabited island 
in 2010, and who brutally keeps tens of thousands of innocent North Koreans as political 
prisoners in gulags,4 over Japan’s elected leader—Abe’s occasional irritating remarks and 
deeds that seem to deny Japan’s past criminal actions against Korea notwithstanding.
Opinion surveys are often unreliable as public opinion is fickle. Moreover, a nation’s 
foreign policy, purportedly pursued in the national interest, may not correlate closely with 
the prevailing opinion of the day. Hence, South Koreans’ apparent counterintuitive attitude 
toward the leaders of Japan, North Korea, and China may variously be considered a transient 
phenomenon, a manifestation of irrational ethno-nationalism, or not particularly germane to 
actual policy vis-à-vis these three powers. On the first proposition that the public’s aversion 
to the Japanese leader, and by extension his government, may be a transitory phenomenon, in 
actuality, relations between Seoul and Tokyo have steadily declined since 2012. In particular, 
with Lee Myung-bak’s visit in August 2012 to Dokdo (Takeshima), the bilateral relationship 
took a noticeable dip.5 Upon arrival, Lee, the first South Korean head of state to visit the 
territory, declared to the squadron of ROK police officers guarding the islets, “Dokdo is 
truly our territory, and it’s worth defending with our lives,”6 deliberately fanning the flames 
of Korean nationalism.
Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko condemned Lee’s visit as “completely unacceptable,” 
pledging to take a “resolute stance on this matter,”7 while his foreign minister characterized 
the visit as “utterly unacceptable” and recalled his ambassador in Seoul.8 With both the 
return of Abe and the election of Park Geun-hye as president in December 2012, prospects 
for improved bilateral relations seemed to improve; however, the trajectory of decline in the 
bilateral relationship has only dipped more steeply since the leadership transitions took place 
in Seoul and Tokyo.9
On the second proposition that South Koreans’ strong sentiments against Japan betray their 
“irrational” nature,10 it is clear that few actions are as effective in domestic politics as fanning 
the flames of anti-Japanese sentiment. After Shimane Prefecture in 2005 designated February 
22 as “Takeshima Day,”11 invoking the decision a hundred years earlier placing “Takeshima” 
(Dokdo) under it, Roh Moo-hyun responded a week later, on March 23, that South Korea 
was on the verge of a “tough diplomatic war with Japan.”12 Casting this decision as a portent 
of a greater threat, Roh wrote in a letter addressed to his fellow Koreans, “We cannot sit back 
and watch Japan justify its history of aggression and colonization and pursue hegemonic 
power again…The issue concerns the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.”13 
Inflammatory rhetoric often begets even more inflammatory rhetoric, and Japan’s Nihon 
Keizai shimbun questioned Roh’s leadership, painting him as one “easily swayed” by public 
opinion, even going so far as to call his emotional language “just like North Korea.”14 
Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) lawmaker Nishimura Shingo went so far as to characterize 
Roh’s remarks as tantamount to throwing the Korea-Japan relationship into a ditch”15
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Park Geun-hye, at the time chairwoman of the opposition Grand National Party, opined, 
“I cannot but wonder whether President Roh’s remarks are appropriate;”16 yet within 
days his approval rating jumped from 20 percent to 48 percent, with 89 percent of South 
Koreans supporting Roh’s feisty remarks.17 Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon stated that Roh’s 
statements represented the ROK government’s “strategic mind,” justifying it after the fact, 
for by all accounts the foreign ministry was kept in the dark about Roh’s “letter” until its 
contents became public. A precedent was set, potentially at the cost of the national interest. 
The lessons were clear: It paid to antagonize Japan when the South Korean public felt Japan 
had been the provocateur. What is more, bashing Japan has the added advantage of winning 
over North Korea,18 which is an attractive proposition to any elected South Korean leader 
intent on improving ties with Pyongyang and chalking up a North Korea legacy.
On the third proposition, whether the public’s distaste for Abe impinges on actual ROK 
foreign policy, it is apparent that Park Geun-hye came into office with predetermined views 
not only on Abe and South Korea’s bilateral relations with Japan but also on Xi Jinping 
and Seoul’s bilateral relations with Beijing. China’s ascendance in world affairs over the 
past decade has been all the more pronounced in the international politics of the Korean 
Peninsula and the region as a whole.19 Whereas it exercised no real influence over the course 
of events during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, since the second 
nuclear crisis flared up in October 2002, Beijing has assumed a central role, both as the 
key determinant in negotiations and as the key arbiter of any meaningful punishment to be 
meted out against North Korea for its continued provocations. More than in any other period 
since its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and its consequent loss of influence, China enjoys 
great sway over the future course of the peninsula. Its economic influence is irreplaceable to 
Pyongyang, and it is a factor that Seoul is extremely reluctant to defy.20
Park has placed great importance on continuing to strengthen bilateral relations with China. 
Barely a month after her election victory on December 19, 2012, she broke with tradition and 
dispatched her first special envoys abroad to Beijing instead of Washington.21 Sequencing of 
summit meetings with leaders of key neighboring states is not without symbolism. What is 
more telling than the first destination for her special envoys was that she chose not to send 
any envoy to Tokyo—although she did receive an envoy representing Abe in early January.22
When Park paid a state visit to China from June 27 to 30, she was given, as the joint 
statement published by Xinhua stated, “a grand welcome and warm hospitality by the 
Chinese Government and people.”23 But buried underneath the diplomatic language of 
“mutual respect” and in spite of substantive “specific action plans” pledging to “open a hot 
line between the foreign ministers” and establish a “Sino-ROK Joint Committee for People-
to-People Exchanges,” was a classic formulation of Chinese ambidexterity:
The ROK side expressed worry at the DPRK’s continued nuclear testing, and 
explicitly stated that it will never recognize the DPRK’s possession of nukes in 
any circumstance. The two sides unanimously hold the view that nuclear weapon 
development seriously threatens peace and stability in Northeast Asia, including 
the Korean Peninsula, and the world. The two sides affirm that achieving 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [emphasis added] and maintaining 
peace and stability there is in the common interest of all parties, and they 
unanimously agree to work for this.24
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The above passage is noteworthy for the conspicuous absence of Chinese subject-object 
agreement. The first sentence omits altogether China’s stance on North Korea’s continued 
nuclear testing and its ever-growing nuclear arsenal. The second sentence fails to identify just 
whose nuclear weapons development “the two sides” are addressing; that is, whether or not 
the extended nuclear deterrence that the United States provides the ROK is also taken into 
account in this indictment. Just whom the Chinese have in mind as the greatest threat to the 
region and the world with its “nuclear weapons development,” whether it is tiny North Korea 
or the gargantuan United States, is left unsaid. Above all, the “denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula,” a phrase that made its official international debut in the September 19, 2005 joint 
statement of the Six-Party Talks, means, in both North Korean and Chinese parlance, not only 
a nuclear-free DPRK, but more pointedly, the abrogation of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the 
dislodging of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the ROK.25 In issuing the above words in its 
joint statement, China maintained its strategic ambiguity on North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programs and the denuclearization of North Korea. The real question here is to what extent 
the ROK was aware of this duplicity and went along with it—or whether Park actually came 
away from the summit believing that Xi was ingenuous in staunchly opposing North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons, as the above passage might, at first glance, suggest. By the ROK foreign 
ministry’s self-congratulatory assessment of Park’s visit as having opened a “new era in 
Korea-China ties,” and in dubbing the summit a “trip of heart and trust,” coming just two days 
after the visit, one may be forgiven for not being able to take a firm position on this question.
Furthermore, during the visit Park purportedly asked Xi to honor a Korean nationalist, Ahn 
Jung-geun, who shot to death Ito Hirobumi, a prominent Japanese leader, at a rail station 
in Harbin on October 26, 1909, by building a statue of Ahn at the station.26 China not only 
obliged, but went considerably further and built a small-but-protective memorial hall over 
Ahn’s statue, which opened on January 19, 2014. Japan condemned the memorial, with 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide claiming that South Korea and China were “banding 
together.” Even before the opening of the memorial, Suga in November 2013 had called 
Ahn a “criminal,” while warning against the tacit Sino-South Korean front against Japan, 
remarking that the construction of the memorial was “not helpful for Japan-South Korea 
relations.”27 Suga also unintentionally baited South Korea and China to strike back with 
the following provocative statement: “We recognize Ahn Jung-Geun as a terrorist who was 
sentenced to death for killing our country’s first prime minister.”28
Japan’s labeling of Ahn, who is universally respected in South Korea, as a “terrorist” 
predictably prompted a prompt reply. Hong Moon-jong, secretary-general of the governing 
party retorted, “If Ahn Jung-guen was a terrorist, then Japan was a terrorist state for having 
mercilessly invaded and plundered countries around it,” while Cho Tae-yong, foreign 
ministry spokesperson, called Suga’s remarks “ignorant and anti-historical,” adding that 
he could “not repress his astonishment.”29 Two days later, China entered the fray. Foreign 
ministry spokesperson Qin Gang, when asked to address the question of Ahn as a “terrorist,” 
replied: “Ahn Jung-geun is, in history, an upholder of justice who fought against Japan’s 
aggression. If Ahn Jung-geun were a ‘terrorist,’ what about the 14 Class A war criminals of 
WWII honored in the Yasukuni Shrine? If the establishment of the Ahn Jung-geun Memorial 
Hall were ‘a tribute to the terrorist,’ what about the Japanese leader’s visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine where Class A war criminals are enshrined?”30
28   |   Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Park’s request to Xi to build a memorial in Ahn Jung-geun’s honor, in both principle and 
historical viewpoint, may be irreproachable. But that the overture was made by the head 
of state of the Republic of Korea to the head of state of the People’s Republic of China 
unnecessarily created the impression in Japan that the two were working in concert against 
Japan.31 From South Korea’s perspective, the request would best have come from a lower-
level official instead of Park herself, for there will likely come a day when the convoluted 
and toxic nature of the triangular relations among Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing will prompt 
Park to seek Japan’s support in advancing South Korea’s interests vis-à-vis China. South 
Korea and China may be aligned by the common history of victimization by imperial Japan, 
but the formal task of remembrance, commemoration, and rectification of history, especially 
international history, is best left to historians and academics instead of heads of state.
South Korea’s Propensity to Tilt  
toward China
Historically, Korea’s most pressing need to find security within the context of trilateral 
relations with China and Japan came in a war, which tore Korean lives apart and devastated 
the Korean land. It touched the lives of the vast majority of Koreans. It was a war that saw 
Chinese troops cross the Yalu River and dramatically alter the fortunes on the battlefield, 
forcing their foes to remain largely confined to the southern half of the peninsula. At its 
end, all the major belligerents claimed victory, while no doubt remained as to who were its 
greatest victims. A major international war in Northeast Asia that shook the status quo in the 
region and presaged the contrasting vicissitudes of national fortune among the combatants, 
it was the Imjin Waeran of 1592-98, referred to in English as “Hideoyoshi’s invasions”—the 
most spectacular manifestation of Korea-China-Japan triangular tensions in history.32
The parallels between this war and the Korean War of 1950-53 are striking. Although the two 
tragic events stand more than 350 years apart, from a Korean perspective, commonalities 
immediately draw attention: the leadership’s vulnerability, ineptitude, and ignorance of the 
strategic environment in the lead-up to the war; its helplessness in the prosecution of the war 
and ceasefire negotiations; and new security challenges that enveloped the Korean Peninsula 
in the postwar era. Following Japan’s invasions in the 1590s, Joseon Korea fell into a long 
period of decline, closing itself off for the next 300 years from foreign intercourse except 
with China and intermittent contact with Japan. The implications of this mindset and self-
seclusion would be painfully felt in the early twentieth century, as Korea, unable to cope with 
the drastically different international order into which it was pulled, was colonized by Japan.
Even in the near term, the Korean monarchy, coming out of the Imjin War, found itself 
caught between a declining Ming China, to which it owed allegiance and debt,33 and a new 
rising power in Manchuria that the Confucian Korean leadership regarded as barbarian. King 
Injo would “misread” the strategic environment and side with the Ming, while alienating 
the Manchus. The result was two devastating and humiliating Manchu invasions of Korea, 
the first in 1627 and the second in 1636. The latter Manchu campaign, in particular, has 
been dramatized into a morality play, a best-selling two-volume history by Han Myonggi. 
Its running theme is the critical need for South Korea today to choose sides wisely in the 
so-called “G-2 era.”34 The main message is that South Korea today is caught up in a shift in 
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the balance of power in the region and the world, with a rapidly rising China and a declining 
United States much in the same manner as the scene 400 years ago with the revisionist 
Manchus on the ascendance and the status quo power Ming in decline.
For North Korea, in the aftermath of the Korean War, its maritime neighbors, South Korea 
and Japan, and the world beyond the Pacific Ocean, effectively became a dead end. Both 
Joseon Korea in the seventeenth century and North Korea in the twentieth century turned 
inward, away from the ocean, and became the quintessential quasi-isolated continental state. 
The ramifications of such a terra-centric policy on the respective mentalities of the Korean 
leadership and conditions of life, respectively, of the people of Joseon and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, hardly require elaboration.
In contrast, South Korea, coming out of the Korean War, pursued a dramatically new course. 
Heavily depending on its patron the United States, it oriented itself toward the Pacific and 
the world beyond for the first time in Korean history. Its rise to maritime prominence as a 
major trading nation of the world captures the essence of the South Korean state today: a 
global leader in shipping, electronics, and a thriving democracy. Yet, as much as South Korea 
has benefitted from its dependent relationship with the United States and as much debt as it 
owes, the rapid rise of China over the past two decades has engendered an atavistic nostalgia 
for China in the traditional vassal state, a romantic attachment rooted in an abstract sense of 
cultural debt that Korea owes—even going back to Ming China’s deliverance of Joseon. South 
Koreans largely remain unencumbered by the ghosts of history in having fought against the 
PRC in the Korean War or, in a marked contrast to complex feelings toward the United States, 
considerations of “flunkeyism” when viewing China today. “Flunkeyism” is a term often used 
by North Korea to deride South Koreans disposed toward “serving the great” (sadaeju-ui: 事
大主意), which, in plain language, means being servile to the United States. For example, an 
article in the Rodong Sinmun last October charged, “Flunkeyism and dependence on foreign 
forces are an inveterate bad habit of the south [sic] Korean ruling quarters.”35
At the heart of the North’s derision lies Korean ethnic nationalism, in particular, 
determination to be self-reliant and independent of external powers in shaping the future of 
the ethnic Korean nation.36 Ethnic nationalism (minjokjuui: 民族主義) is hardly native or 
exclusive to Korea. However, in the Korean context, and particularly in the common lexical 
configuration uri minkokggiri (“by the Korean ethnic nation ourselves”), the term has an 
unmistakable connotation of Korean exceptionalism and exclusivity. This phrase is featured 
in the first article of the South-North Joint Declaration signed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Jong-il at the 2000 Pyongyang summit signifying the spirit and method by which the Koreans 
will determine their future. The same Korean phrase transliterated slightly differently, uri 
minzokkiri, is the official name of a website run by the Committee for the Peaceful Unification 
of the Fatherland, a major arm of the North Korean propaganda machinery founded in 
1961 under the auspices of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Unmistakably, national identity 
politics resonate in both the North and the South, and in the latter, with particular force in 
the context of South Korea’s asymmetrical relationship with the United States. Since Korea’s 
liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, the founding of the Republic of Korea in 1948, 
through America’s deliverance of the ROK in the Korean War, to Seoul’s ongoing dependent 
relationship Washington today, ethnic nationalism has been a psychic force in South Korea’s 
relationship with the United States.37
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In contrast to complex attitudes bordering on an inferiority complex toward Japan and the 
United States, which occasionally manifest themselves in large-scale, organized protests 
against these countries, contemporary attitudes toward China are characterized by relatively 
high tolerance for Chinese misdeeds against Korea—which suggests a misguided shade 
of superiority complex. For example, in April 2008, the Olympic torch relay through 
Seoul, on its way to the Summer Olympics in Beijing, triggered a violent clash between 
thousands of Chinese nationals and anti-Beijing South Korean and Tibetan human rights 
activists. In the melee, hundreds of Chinese, some armed with poles and pipes, were seen 
attacking Tibetans and their South Korean supporters, not to mention journalists and the 
South Korean riot police. Several chased the police into the lobby of the Seoul Plaza Hotel, 
an upscale hotel just across the street from City Hall, and repeatedly thrust their weapons 
at the police. This unusual infringement on South Korean sovereignty initially did trigger 
indignation and anti-Chinese commentary in the South Korean media and chat rooms.38 But 
the anger and animosity were short-lived. The spectacle of thousands of Chinese nationals 
assaulting South Korean citizens, including the national police, in the South Korean capital 
in broad daylight certainly did not lead to any kind of organized political protest in front of 
the PRC embassy in Seoul or sustained civic movement against the Chinese government. 
Such apparent collective equanimity stands in contrast to the outpouring of indignation 
and massive demonstration at a far less serious contemporaneous case of perceived foreign 
infringement—that from the United States. South Korea’s resumption of the import of 
U.S beef triggered widespread, unfounded fears of debilitating health implications from 
consuming U.S. beef, and widespread anger at both Seoul and Washington for colluding 
in this racket. Anger and ambivalence toward the United States unleashed massive protests 
that virtually shut down downtown Seoul for over two months,39 while occasional news 
reports on questionable Chinese-produced foods—ranging from fake to tainted to harmful—
entering the South Korean market have produced to date no such social movement. Even 
China’s provocative announcement on November 23, 2013, of an East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ), which impinges on South Korean jurisdiction, triggered no 
serious anti-Chinese rhetoric or protests, whereas such a declaration by Japan would most 
likely have resulted in a very different reaction in South Korea.
Were the public’s acute sensitivity to perceived U.S. or Japanese infringement and relative 
composure in the face of actual Chinese infringement not reflected in South Korea’s foreign 
policy, such phenomena may not merit attention in the context of South Korea’s international 
relations. However, South Korea’s latent attachment to China over the United States came 
close to becoming official policy, when President Roh, during a speech at the air force 
academy in February 2005 declared that South Korea would assume the role of “balancer” 
in Northeast Asia. Roh’s statement variously suggested an intermediary role for South 
Korea in the region, aligning with China against Japan, and checking U.S. strategic policy 
in the region by inching away from Washington and closer to Beijing. These concerns were 
confirmed in subsequent months by the Roh government’s repeated calls for an “independent 
military,” which would not be drawn into a conflict started by the United States, and decrease 
in military exchanges with Japan—as well as Roh’s “diplomatic war” statement in March—, 
while elevating military ties with China and vetoing even discussions with the United States 
of joint contingency operations in North Korea in the event of a change in the status quo in the 
North.40 Roh’s “balancer” statement immediately drew criticism from the main opposition 
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party, with party leader Park Geun-hye assailing Roh’s notion of taking a neutral, balancing 
role in the region while maintaining a strong alliance with the United States. “The role of 
a balancer is possible only when we have the power and capability, and other countries 
recognize us as a balancer. But China, Japan, Russia and even North Korea do not recognize 
us as a balancer,” Park said in a speech at the National Assembly. She went on to warn: “If 
we break away from the alliance with the United States and isolate ourselves diplomatically, 
it will do no good for our national interest.”41 Criticism of Roh was not confined to his 
opposition party. Even Stephen Bosworth, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and one 
not known for his immoderate views or undiplomatic remarks, warned that any attempt by 
South Korea to play the role of the “balancer” in the region would be to “punch above its 
weight class” and that if South Korea were “bent on pursuing that role,” one could not rule 
out the possibility of “damaging the alliance.”42
Needless to say, Park has not shown any inclination to align her nation with China to the 
detriment of the alliance with the United States. Park’s bona fide pro-U.S. stance has never 
come into question, and it is all but an open secret that Washington was relieved and pleased 
by Park’s election in December 2012. Neither has she made any remarks such as “What’s 
wrong with being anti-American?” as Roh did during his bid for the presidency in 2002,43 or 
stir up controversy during her visit to China as Roh did, upon being queried on the Chinese 
figures he most respects during a visit to China in 2003, “Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.”44 
It is also exceedingly unlikely that any former high-ranking U.S. official ever will come to 
call Park “anti-American” and “probably a little crazy,” as former Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates did Roh in his memoir.45 Therefore, the controversies and strains in the ROK-U.S. 
bilateral relationship may be said to be confined to the Roh presidency. At the same time, 
the structural imperatives of the triangular relations among South Korea, Japan, and China 
favor China, at a cost to the U.S.-led trilateral quasi-alliance among Washington, Seoul, and 
Tokyo, whenever friction between Seoul and Tokyo comes to the fore. As much as the Obama 
administration may sympathize with South Korea’s indignation at the Abe administration for 
its frequent undiplomatic remarks and, in particular, Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine last 
December, it can only regard a South Korea that openly turns its back on Japan as a strategic 
liability, for any fissure among the three nations can only favor China’s strategic interests. 
Furthermore, there is no question that since the Park-Xi summit, South Korea has far more 
actively pursued diplomacy with China than with Japan, in variety and degree, on issues 
ranging from negotiations on a free trade agreement, increased cooperation on international 
security issues, and cultural, humanities, and technological exchange programs. In particular, 
ROK national security chief Kim Jang-soo and Chinese State Counselor Yang Jiechi met 
in Seoul in mid-November and agreed to open strategic dialogue channels on diplomacy 
and security policies governing both countries. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan held 
all of three open meetings between July and December, two of which addressed free trade 
agreement issues in a trilateral setting involving China.46
Since the early 1950s, the United States has intermittently played the role of intermediary 
between South Korea and Japan. The exigencies of the Korean War created a pressing need 
for it to seek to improve relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Washington arranged for the 
first bilateral meeting between the two nations during the war, in October 1951, in Tokyo. 
At the outset, the Korean delegate, Kim Young-shik, called for an apology from Japan 
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for its invasion and colonial rule of Korea. The meeting fell apart in acrimony.47 In 1953, 
the United States arranged for another meeting between the two sides in Tokyo. Kubota 
Kanichiro, the Japanese delegate, told the Korean delegation that the United States violated 
international law in liberating Korea and establishing the ROK prior to concluding a peace 
treaty with Japan, in redistributing Japanese-held Korean properties to Koreans, and in 
repatriating Japanese nationals from Korea. Kubota also insisted that Koreans should be 
grateful for all the improvements made by Japan during the occupation of Korea, and that 
“Japan’s compulsory occupation of Korea...was beneficial to the Korean people.” Kubota 
also said the South Koreans were “servile to the powerful and high-handed to the weak,” 
adding that “efforts should be started to bring down” the South Korean administration of 
Syngman Rhee.48 Kubota’s remarks reflected sentiments stated earlier by a member of the 
Diet, that “we refuse to stand in silence watching...Koreans...swaggering about as if they 
were nationals of victorious nations...it is most deplorable that those who lived under our 
law and order until the last moment of the surrender should suddenly alter their attitude to 
act like conquerors.”49 No further meetings between Seoul and Tokyo took place until 1958.
The different strategic implications between South Korea’s strained relationship with Japan 
during the Cold War and today are apparent. In the former period, South Korea not only did 
not have diplomatic relations with China, but was, in view of its poverty and corresponding 
international standing, nothing resembling the key regional economic player that it is today. 
Until the 1980s, when the Japanese textbooks issue became a thorn in Sino-Japanese and 
South Korean-Japanese relations, South Korea’s apathy or even animosity toward Japan 
offered little strategic value to China, since Beijing’s leverage vis-à-vis Seoul was limited. 
China’s primary concern in its relationship with both South Korea and Japan for most of 
the Cold War era was the presence of U.S. troops in these countries. However, since the end 
of the Cold War and the normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and 
China in 1992, China has found a new economic means of pressuring South Korea, and, in 
recent years, has grown increasingly bold in sending that admonitory message to Seoul. For 
example, an editorial in the Global Times in July 2012 warned Seoul:
South Korea benefits from Chinese prosperity, and a rational South Korea should 
continue to play the role of a balancer in Northeast Asia. A military alliance 
between South Korea and Japan poses a potential threat to China. As a result, 
China should firmly oppose the move and try to persuade South Korea not to 
further its military alliance with Japan and the U.S. 
Ahead of Obama’s visit to Japan and South Korea in late April, the United States has in recent 
months exhorted its two allies in Northeast Asia to improve relations and not exacerbate the 
situation.51 In fact, Park and Abe held their first formal talks in a trilateral setting with Obama 
during the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in late March.52 This marked the first 
formal meeting between the leaders of South Korea and Japan since the trilateral meeting 
among Lee Myung-bak, Noda, and Hu Jintao in Beijing on May 14, 2012, which ended an 
unusually long lull in bilateral summit diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo.
The triangular dynamics among South Korea, Japan, and China today favor China, 
principally due to the occasional fissure in the bilateral relationship between Seoul and 
Tokyo and Seoul’s propensity to hedge in its relationship with China and the United States, 
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whether on security issues like joining the U.S.-led missile defense system or on economic 
issues like joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).53 The trilateral relations among the 
three nations today resemble less an equilateral or even an isosceles triangle, with equal 
distance maintained between Beijing and Seoul and between Beijing and Tokyo. Rather, 
they resemble more a scalene triangle with a fluctuating, but shorter, distance maintained 
between Beijing and Seoul than between Beijing and Tokyo.
Implications for the Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo 
Triangle and Regional Security
The trilateral relations among South Korea, China, and Japan cannot be properly considered 
outside the context of the long-term strategic competition between the United States and 
China and the growing ballistic missile and nuclear threat posed by North Korea. The 
United States, as the preeminent military power in the world, is unlikely to compromise 
its strategic goals of containing China and North Korea, the principal source of threat in 
Northeast Asia. To what extent its two allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, support 
U.S. policy objectives, will determine the nature of the Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo triangle in 
the near term.
On October 3, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
laid a wreath at Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery in Tokyo and paid their respects to 
unidentified Japanese war dead from the Pacific War. It was the first time that two U.S. 
cabinet ministers paid such homage in the postwar era as well as in the history of U.S.-
Japan relations. This remarkable show of solidarity and resolve not to let “historical issues” 
mar the bilateral relationship would not have been possible without the mutual trust and 
genuine friendship built over the past 68 years on the shared values of democracy, the 
rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights. This symbolic act was a 
statement that the United States recognized Japan as a global political power and a stalwart 
partner in facing the “complex regional security environment,” as mentioned in the meeting 
of the U.S.-Japan SCC in Tokyo on the same day. In simple terms, this environment means 
the challenges and threats posed by the “blood alliance” between China and North Korea.
The United States also expressed its support for Japan’s decision to establish its own 
National Security Council and contribute more proactively to maintaining both regional 
and global peace and security, welcoming Japan’s decision to review its legal procedures 
in order to exercise collective self-defense. In particular, the United States and Japan, for 
the sake of a “more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities,” decided to “expand 
security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond” by revising the 
1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by the end of 2014.54 This is a 
noteworthy development as it presumes Japan’s collective self-defense as a fait accompli 
and thereby implies Japan’s considerably expanded global security role in the future. This 
newly elevated alliance also means U.S. support for Japan’s right to missile interception. 
The two sides agreed to establish “a more interoperable and flexible force posture that 
enables side-by-side and agile contingency response” in order to counter challenges against 
security and international norms.
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On his way to Japan, Hagel paid a visit to South Korea and met with Park. The meeting, 
according to The New York Times, came as “something of a shock.”55 Instead of reviewing 
and confirming ways to jointly meet the security challenge from China and North Korea, 
Park “delivered a lecture about Japan’s ‘total absence of sincerity’ over the suffering that 
imperial Japan caused Korea in the last century and finished with a request of her own: that 
Washington force Tokyo to behave.”56 As with Xi on the Ahn Jung-geun memorial, Park, 
in trying to rectify her nation’s history with Japan by appealing to a foreign statesman, was 
acting like an historian instead of a president. The contrast between Japan and South Korea 
must have been stark for the U.S. government. The United States and Japan fought a vicious 
war against each other, but the two nations do not preoccupy themselves with or bicker over 
“events of the past.” Instead, the two allies focus on meeting the security threat from the 
region, although neither faces a direct existential threat from either China or North Korea.
South Korea, on the other hand, does face a direct, if not an imminent, existential threat 
from North Korea, which China supports. Despite the recent thaw in inter-Korean relations, 
marked by the first vice-ministerial level talks between the two Koreas since 2007, which led 
to temporary reunion meetings between separated families, North Korea is bound to provoke 
the South again with a weapons test or even a direct, if not limited, attack. Since Kim Jong-
un’s dramatic purge of his uncle, Jang Song-taek, in December 2013, the impression has 
spread in Seoul that the Kim regime may be unstable due to political intrigues compounded 
by internal stresses, and, as a result, the North is reaching out to the South for economic aid. 
This view does not fully take into consideration that demonstrative punishment of alleged 
offenders, along with their family and minions, has remained the key instrument of regime 
preservation throughout the state’s existence. Violent and pervasive purges were critical 
during the formative years under Kim Il-sung, following the disastrous outcome of the greatest 
gamble by the dynasty, the Korean War.57 Likewise, when Kim Jong-il was attempting to 
consolidate his rule in the mid-1990s he sent tremors though the military establishment by 
executing hundreds of people suspected of planning a coup within the Sixth Army Corps.58
The latest purge in North Korea may not be a harbinger of any meaningful change for the 
better in that country. The drama surrounding Jang’s swift fall has triggered widespread 
speculation, ranging from instability and imminent coup, to popular uprising. Beyond 
doubt, the prolonged decay of the North Korean system, accentuated by a catastrophic 
famine in the mid- to late-1990s, has thoroughly disillusioned portions of the elite with their 
political system. But there is no reliable indication that the Kim regime is on the brink of a 
crisis or unable to govern. North Korea will soon enough return to its strategy of periodic 
provocations, and South Korea will once again see that China, despite its thinly veiled 
disdain for the leadership in Pyongyang, will go to extremes to defend it. China will refrain 
from taking action that may destabilize the Kim regime, despite signing onto UN Security 
Council resolutions purporting to punish Pyongyang.
South Korea should fully be aware that the recent “peace offensive” by Pyongyang is more 
likely a smokescreen before a provocation than a genuine overture seeking reconciliation. 
All states, to varying degree, practice strategic deception—or sending out mixed signals 
in order to mislead or deceive one’s adversary. North Korea has taken this to a lethal 
level. Blatant deception on the eve of a provocative act has been its mode of operation 
since at least 1950.
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Just days before invading South Korea in June 1950, North Korea reached out to the South 
for high-level talks on unification. Kim Il-sung started the Korean War in order to complete 
the North Korean revolution, which remains the highest goal of the North Korean state 
today. It was a high-risk gamble, the biggest gamble by the Kim dynasty to date. In short, 
Kim needed to deceive his enemy with a smokescreen before he attacked.
On the eve of detonating a bomb at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Rangoon, Burma on October 
9, 1983, targeting President Chun Doo-hwan, North Korea asked China’s help in conveying 
that it sought direct bilateral talks with the Reagan administration. Beijing gladly obliged, 
and the next day the bomb went off, killing 17 South Korean officials and four Burmese 
nationals. This was an important operation for Pyongyang, because the previous year Kim 
Il-sung had officially anointed his son, Jong-un, heir. The untested heir apparent needed 
to prove his military mettle against the despised South Korean head of state. Hence, the 
smokescreen was a crucial tactic in advancing Pyongyang’s objectives.
On March 3, 2010, North Korea sought military talks with the South. On March 26, it 
torpedoed the Cheonan. On October 30 of that year, the two Koreas held their last family 
reunion meetings. On November 11, the North called for talks on Mt. Kumgang. On 
November 23, it shelled a South Korean island, killing four South Korean nationals. This 
was the crucial year for Kim Jong-un coming out, which he did by name in late September 
and, in person, standing next to his father on the reviewing stand at a military parade on 
October 10, Party Founding Day. The inexperienced heir, compelled to prove his military 
mettle, resorted to strategic deception before attacking the South in March and November 
of that year.
Kim Jong-un used the same tactic on the eve of his long-range missile test on December 
12, 2012. On December 8, the North publicly extended its timeline to late-December for 
launching, as it said, a satellite into space. This led many North Korea watchers to speculate 
that it may be having second thoughts in the face of Chinese pressure. On December 10, the 
North stated that it was having “technical difficulties,” prompting observers to assume that it 
was abandoning the planned launch. In this way, it caught many officials in Washington off-
guard when it went ahead with the launch on the morning of December 12, exactly one week 
before the South Korean presidential election—a perfect window of opportunity to remind 
the South Korean public that it needs to be appeased.
The North’s strategic objectives remain the same. Kim Jong-un may appreciate food, fertilizer, 
and other blandishments from the South, but he can live without them. Yet, what he does 
need is to raise the stakes yet again by reminding his neighbors that North Korea is a political 
factor with which they need to deal. Translated into plain language, that means provoke with 
another weapons test so that Kim’s bigger neighbors will, after a decent interval following 
condemnatory pronouncements, go into damage-control mode and appease Pyongyang once 
again with negotiations and tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.
In short, as the North has little to lose in canceling all talks and reverting to its strategy of 
provocations and limited attacks, it likely will do that again soon. When that time comes, 
Japan will reaffirm its alliance with the United States and strengthen its defense posture 
against North Korea. China will express its displeasure at Pyongyang in meaningless 
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diplomatic language such as “unacceptable” and “provocative,” while in actuality increasing 
aid to North Korea as it did in the aftermath of each of Pyongyang’s three nuclear tests to 
date. South Korea, in that fleeting moment of clarity, will see that Japan is actually a tacit 
ally and China an unstated foe.
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